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I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from section 1. In section 5 I argue that the account leads us to priority monism.

I begin by arguing that if any truths require truthmakers then all truths require truthmakers. I then propose the view that it is the world that is the truthmaker for negative existentials and defend this view against the leading rival accounts of truthmakers for negative truths. I end by responding to the objection that this makes truthmaker theory useless as a guide to what there is.

In this paper I look at two familiar objections to Lewisian Modal Realism: that Lewisian worlds have nothing to do with modality, and that we couldn't know what went on at Lewisian worlds even if there were any. I show how Lewis' response to both objections presupposes the truth of Lewisian realism, and argue that this results in warrant for Lewisian realism being unobtainable.

In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world: they are trivially true, in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that such sentences must be necessarily true, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I apply the thought to truthmaker theory and argue that if there are truthmakers for contingent intrinsic predications then they must be states of affairs rather than tropes.

Quine said that the ontological question can be asked in three words, ‘What is there?’, and answered in one, ‘everything’. He was wrong. We need an extra word to ask the ontological question: it is ‘What is there, really?’; and it cannot be answered truthfully with ‘everything’ because there are some things that exist but which don’t really exist (and maybe even some things that really exist but which don’t exist).

There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning composition hold necessarily. I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as identity, but argue that the version of this doctrine that entails universalism is implausible. I consider the claim that the a priority of such facts leads to their necessity, but give a defence of substantial contingent a priori truths. I ask whether the contingency of such facts would lead to unwelcome possibilities, but argue that the worrying looking possibilities can be blocked if it is desired. Next, I argue against the thought that the Lewis-Sider argument against restricted composition might give us reason to accept the necessity of universalism. Lastly, I respond to two objections from the 2006 BSPC. I conclude in favour of the contingency of the facts concerning when some things compose some thing.

Works of music don’t appear to be concrete objects; but they do appear to be created by composers, and abstract objects don’t seem to be the kind of things that can be created. In this paper I aim to develop an ontological position that lets us salvage the creativity intuition without either adopting an ontology of created abstracta or identifying musical works with concreta. I will argue that there are no musical works in our ontology, but nevertheless the English sentences we want to hold true are literally true. I rely on a meta-ontological view whereby ‘a exists’ can be true without committing us to an entity that is a. This meta-ontological view is illustrated by its application to the familiar example of the statue and the clay. I argue that my account of musical ontology fares better on the balance of costs and benefits than its rivals.

In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.

In this paper I examine Lewis' objection to truthmaker theory (at least without counterpart theory): that it commits us to unacceptable, and un-Humean, necessary connections between wholly distinct existences. I argue that no plausible version of the Humean doctrine is incompatible with truthmaker theory.

The truthmaker principle, that for every true proposition there is some thing (or things) whose existence necessitates the truth of that proposition, is often appealed to, but less often argued for. In this essay I will try and say something about why I believe it; or at least, why I think it a reasonable principle for the ontologist to be guided by. I will suggest that it is wrong both to think of the truthmaker principle as a constraint on any acceptable metaphysic and to dismiss it as completely unmotivated. The truthmaker principle offers benefits, but not ones that cannot be outweighed; as is often the case, the question is simply whether the benefits are worth the cost.

This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that there can’t be infinitely descending chains of ontological dependence. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.

I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind-dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: the problem of accounting for the source of modal truth.