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The paper has two main objectives: first, it presents a new argument against the so-called Anscombe Thesis (if x φ-s by ψ-ing, then x’s φ-ing = x’s ψ-ing). Second, it develops a proposal about the syntax and semantics of the ‘by’-locution.

The article scrutinises the semantics of canonical property designators of the forms ‘the property of being F’ and ‘F-ness’. First it is argued that, as their form suggests, the former are definite definitions, albeit of a special sort. Secondly, the prima facie plausible classification of the latter as proper names (which is often met in philosophical writings) is rejected. The semantics of such terms is developed and it is shown how its proper understanding yields important consequences about the concepts expressed by these terms.

Are all canonical property designators (i.e. nominalizations of predicative phrases) rigid? Dan López de Sa recently criticized the arguments I gave for an affirmative answer to that question (see my 'Property Designators, Predicates, and Rigidity', Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 227–41). The current article rebuts López de Sa’s objections.

The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property.

The article discusses an idea of how to extend the notion of rigidity to predicates: predicates stand in a certain systematic semantic relation (which I call signification) to properties, such that this relation may hold rigidly or non-rigidly. The relation of signification can be characterised with recourse to canonical property designators that are derived from predicates (or general terms) by means of nominalization: a predicate signifies that property which the derived property designator designates. Whether signification divides into rigid and non-rigid cases will then depend upon whether canonical property designators divide into rigid and non-rigid ones. But, I shall argue, they do not, and so the only notion of rigidity gained this way is trivial. To show this, I first focus on the kind of canonical property designators which could be thought to be non-rigid, canonical designators such as ‘having the colour of ripe tomatoes’, which themselves contain non-rigid property designators. An argument to the effect that such complex canonical designators are non-rigid is rebutted, five arguments to the effect that they are rigid are formulated, and finally an explanation of their rigidity based on the general nature of canonical property designators is presented.

The main question of this paper is how to understand the notion of a truth-maker. First I show that the identification of truth-making with necessitation cannot capture the pretheoretic understanding of notions such as ‘x makes something true’. Then I examine Barry Smith’s reaction to this problem: he defines truth-making as the combination of necessitation and projection. I focus on the formal part of Smith’s account, which is shown to yield undesired results. However, I present an alternative account of projection, which fares better and can fruitfully be employed to circumvent the problems raised before. Unfortunately, the account still has to face some troublemakers. I conclude, therefore, with a pessimistic view on the project of defining truth-making via necessitation and projection.

The article develops an analysis of the notion of a truth-maker which relates it to other notions of making something such-and-such. It is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general mechanisms of the concepts involved. A schematic explication of a whole battery of related notions is offered. It is based on an explanatory notion, introduced by the sentential operator ‘because’. Finally, on the basis of the explication proposed, an argument is developed to the effect that the objects usually regarded as truth-makers are not apt to play this role.