| Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Practices |
| Ralph Wedgwood |
| Forthcoming in Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief (Synthese Library, Springer Press) |
| Area 1 Epistemology |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Mind |
| Keywords |
| http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/primitively.htm |
| http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/primitively.a4.pdf |
| http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/primitively.ltr.pdf |
| This paper proposes an answer to one of the most profound and difficult questions of epistemology: What can make a belief-forming practice rational if its rationaolity is not due to the availability of some independent justification for believing that the belief-forming practice is reliable? |
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