| Temporal Externalism, Constitutive Norms, and Theories of Vagueness |
| Henry Jackman |
| In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press (2006) |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Language |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Logic |
| Keywords Temporal Externalism Vagueness |
| http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/CNV.pdf |
| Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The ‘disquotational’ principle, which manifests itself in our commitment to T-sentences, and the ‘correspondence’ principle, which manifests itself in our commitment to meaning being a function of use. It has recently been argued that the phenomenon of vagueness brings these principles into conflict and thus shows that our pretheoretic concept of truth is inconsistent. This paper argues that the supposed conflict only occurs if one presupposes a ‘presentist’ conception of semantic facts, and that such semantic presentism is much more reasonable to give up than either the correspondence or disquotational principles. |
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