| Foundationalism, Coherentism and Rule Following Skepticism |
| Henry Jackman |
| International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 11, No. 1, (March 2003), pp. 25-41. |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Language |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Mind |
| Keywords Wittgenstein Kripke Holism |
| http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Kripkenstein.pdf |
| Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts. |
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