| James' Pragmatic Account of Intentionality and Truth |
| Henry Jackman |
| The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter 1998, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1. |
| Area 1 American Pragmatism |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Language |
| Keywords James Truth Intentionality |
| http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/James-int-truth.pdf |
| William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they come to seem as plausible as they manifestly did to James. |
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