| Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive |
| Robert Briscoe |
| Forthcoming in Mind and Language |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Mind |
| Area 2 Epistemology |
| Keywords Enactive Account; Sensorimotor Contingency Theory; P-Properties; Spatial Representation; Object Recognition; Alva Noë; Action-Oriented Representation; Mental Imagery |
| http://www.loyno.edu/~rebrisco/documents/vamp.pdf |
| http://www.loyno.edu/~rebrisco/documents/vamp.doc |
| In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves an act of visual imagination guided by seeing – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.’ |