| Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism |
| Ingo Brigandt |
| Philosophy of Science 70: 1305–1316 (2003) |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Biology |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Science |
| Keywords species concepts pluralism eliminativism |
| http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt/ereshefsky.pdf |
| http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001055/00/Brigandt.doc |
| Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts. |
This site makes heavy use of CSS and some use of the DOM and JavaScript.
It is strongly recommended that you use a current standards-compliant browser to view it, such as Firefox.
If you are having difficulties with the site, please write the maintainer and include your User Agent string, which is:
CCBot/1.0 (+http://www.commoncrawl.org/bot.html)
Have a nice day.
