| Biological Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference |
| Ingo Brigandt |
| In: Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, J. C. Marek and M. E. Reicher (eds), Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 58–60 (2004) |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Language |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Science |
| Keywords reference concepts natural kind terms |
| http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt/ALWS_04.pdf |
| http://cogprints.org/3935/1/ALWS_04_Brigandt.pdf |
| This paper uses an example from biology, the homology concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theory of reference give an incomplete account of reference determination. It is suggested that in addition to samples and stereotypical properties, the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of natural kind terms. |
This site makes heavy use of CSS and some use of the DOM and JavaScript.
It is strongly recommended that you use a current standards-compliant browser to view it, such as Firefox.
If you are having difficulties with the site, please write the maintainer and include your User Agent string, which is:
CCBot/1.0 (+http://www.commoncrawl.org/bot.html)
Have a nice day.
