| Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change |
| Ingo Brigandt |
| In: Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy, M. Hernandez Iglesias (ed), Universidad de Murcia: Murcia, pp. 30–34 (2004) |
| Area 1 Philosophy of Mind |
| Area 2 Philosophy of Science |
| Keywords concepts concept individuation conceptual role semantics conceptual change |
| http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt/SEFA_04.pdf |
| http://cogprints.org/3934/01/SEFA_04_Brigandt.pdf |
| The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and interests, its content can be individuated in different ways. |
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