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        <title>Phonline Updates</title>
        <description><![CDATA[Updates from Phonline: Online Papers in Philosophy]]></description>
        <link>http://phonline.org/</link>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 11 May 2008 22:59:54 +0100</lastBuildDate>
        <generator>FeedCreator 1.7.2</generator>
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            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;A Platonic Theory of Reasons for Action&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=985</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper articulates a conception of reasons for action according to which all reasons for action are grounded in the relationship between the courses of action that are available to the agent at the relevant time and what are here called the "<i>intrinsic values</i>". Even though these intrinsic values are conceived of in a way that makes them very similar to how they are thought of by consequentialist moral theorists, this conception of reasons for action is designed to leave room for an aggressively anti-consequentialist view, according to which we have no reasons to "promote" these intrinsic values (at least in the consequentialists' sense of "promoting").]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=984</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper is an interpretation of the central part of Plato's <i>Symposium</i> (199d - 212a). It is argued that Diotima's suggestive remarks in this part of the dialogue outline a conception of the rational motivation of the ideally virtuous agent, according to which the virtuous agent is motivated above all to put herself into the right sort of relation to what has intrinsic value (or as Plato puts it, what is <i>kalon</i>). This help us to achieve a deeper understanding of what Plato's "eudaemonism" consists in.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;The Moral Evil Demons&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=983</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper deals with the problem that persistent moral disagreement poses for moral realism -- given that it is plausible that not all moral disagreement is caused by irrationality or non-moral error or ignorance, but some moral disagreement is caused by what are here called "moral evil demons" instead. For a realist, the solution must lie in a general account of the epistemic significance of disagreement. In this paper, a general view of disagreement is defended, according to which it can be rational for both sides of the disagreement to take it to be more likely that it is the other party to the disagreement who is in error, even if there is no "independent" way of adjudicating the dispute.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;A New Solution to the Newcomb Problem?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=982</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper outlines suggests a new solution to the Newcomb problem – different from the familiar solutions of both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). According to this new solution, the relevant probabilities are the conditional probabilities that are favoured by EDT; but the theory agrees with CDT in implying that if there are any dominant options, they are the only rational options, because there is a “causal” element, not in the relevant probabilities, but in the relevant measure of “degrees of correctness” instead.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Cesare Cozzo, &quot;Rule-following and the Objectivity of Proof&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=981</link>
            <description></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cozzo&quot;&gt;Cesare Cozzo&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Cesare Cozzo, &quot;Meaning and Argument. ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=980</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This study presents and develops in detail (a new version of) the argumental conception of meaning. The two basic principles of the argumental conception of meaning are: i) To know (implicitly) the sense of a word is to know (implicitly) all the argumentation rules concerning that word; ii) To know the sense of a sentence is to know the syntactic structure of that sentence and to know the senses of the words occurring in it. The sense of a sentence is called immediate argumental role of that sentence. According to the argumental conception of meaning a theory of meaning for a particular language yields a systematic specification of the understanding of every sentence of the language which consists in a specification of the immediate argumental role of the sentence. 

The immediate argumental role is a particular aspect of the use of a sentence in arguments. But it is not the whole use in arguments, nor is the whole use in arguments reducible to the immediate argumental role. That is why, by accepting the argumental conception of meaning, we can have epistemological holism without linguistic holism. 

The argumental conception distinguishes between the understanding and the correctness of a language. Such a distinction makes it possible to account for our understanding of paradoxical languages.

Redundancy theory of truth, realistic conceptions of truth or epistemic conceptions of truth are all compatible with an argumental conception of sense. But here it is argued that an epistemic conception of truth is preferrable.

Acceptance of the argumental conception of meaning and of an epistemic conception of truth leads to a rejection of the idea of analytic truth. The argumental conception is pluralistic with respect to the understandability of different logics, and neutral with respect to their correctness.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cozzo&quot;&gt;Cesare Cozzo&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>David Owens, &quot;Promising Without Intending&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=979</link>
            <description><![CDATA[It is widely held that one who sincerely promises to do something must at least intend to do that thing: a promise communicates the intention to perform. In this paper, I argue that a promise need only communicate the intention to undertake an obligation to perform. I consider examples of sincere promisors who have no intention of performing. I argue that this fits well with what we want to say about other performatives - giving, commanding etc. Furthermore, it supports a theory of promissory obligation which I have advocated elsewhere - the authority interest theory - against the orthodox information interest theory.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=pi1djo&quot;&gt;David Owens&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>David Owens, &quot;Deliberation and the First Person&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=978</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=pi1djo&quot;&gt;David Owens&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>David Owens, &quot;Freedom and Practical Judgement&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=977</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Unlike many other animals, human beings enjoy freedom of action. They are capable of acting freely because they have certain psychological capacities which other animals lack. In this paper, I argue that the crucial capacity here is our ability to make practical judgements; to make judgements about what we ought to do. A number of other writers share this view but they treat practical judgement as a form of belief. Since, as I argue, we don't control our beliefs, that undermines this model of human freedom. I suggest a different account of practical judgement, according to which they are cognitive states but not beliefs and I show how this provides us with a better model of practical freedom.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=pi1djo&quot;&gt;David Owens&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Marcus Rossberg, Daniel Cohnitz, &quot;Logical Consequence for Nominalists&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=976</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Many authors (such as Parsons, Resnik, Shapiro, Hale and Wright) have argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine's which they developed in their 1947 paper "Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism" and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Rossberg&quot;&gt;Marcus Rossberg&lt;/a&gt;, Daniel Cohnitz</author>
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            <title>Kieran Setiya, &quot;Believing at Will&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=975</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in "Deciding to Believe," attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=ksetiya&quot;&gt;Kieran Setiya&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Arvid Båve, &quot;Why Is A Truth-Predicate Like A Pronoun?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=974</link>
            <description><![CDATA[I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection may be spelled out thus: given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, and the need for the comparison with pronouns would then be lost. It turns out that objections (b) and (c) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=arvidbave&quot;&gt;Arvid Båve&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Carlo Cellucci, &quot;Why Proof? What is a Proof?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=973</link>
            <description></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cellucci&quot;&gt;Carlo Cellucci&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Carlo Cellucci, &quot;The Universal Generalization Problem&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=972</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Why is universal generalization justified? Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mill, Gentzen gave alternative solutions of this problem. In this paper I consider Locke’s, Berkeley’s and Gentzen’s solutions and argue that they are problematic. Then I consider an alternative formulation of universal generalization which depends on the view that mathematical objects are hypotheses introduced to solve mathematical problems and mathematical proofs are argument schemata. I argue that this alternative formulation is satisfactory, that it is related to the approach to generality of Greek mathematics, and that there is a connection between it and a special form of the analogy rule implicit in Proclus.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cellucci&quot;&gt;Carlo Cellucci&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Marcus Rossberg, &quot;First-Order Logic, Second-Order Logic, and Completeness&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=971</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper investigates the claim that the second-order consequence relation is intractable because of the incompleteness result for SOL. The opponents’ claim is that SOL cannot be proper logic since it does not have a complete deductive system. I argue that the lack of a completeness theorem, despite being an interesting result, cannot be held against the status of SOL as a proper logic.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Rossberg&quot;&gt;Marcus Rossberg&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Marcus Rossberg, Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, &quot;McGee on Open-ended Schemas&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=970</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Vann McGee claims that open-ended schemas are more innocuous than ordinary second-order quantification, particularly in terms of ontological commitment. We argue that this is not the case.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Rossberg&quot;&gt;Marcus Rossberg&lt;/a&gt;, Nikolaj Jang Pedersen</author>
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            <title>Marcus Rossberg, Philip Ebert, &quot;What is the Purpose of Neo-Logicism?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=969</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper introduces and evaluates two contemporary approaches of neo-logicism. Our aim is to highlight the differences between these two neo-logicist programmes and clarify what each projects attempts to achieve. To this end, we first introduce the programme of the Scottish school – as defended by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright which we believe to be a form of epistemic foundationalism in which logic is intended to play a foundational role in resolving specific epistemic challenges, such as our knowledge of arithmetic and analysis. We contrast this with what we call the Stanford/Edmonton school whose project is put forth and defended by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta. This latter approach is a form of axiomatic metaphysics, which, if successful, achieves a different aim. Having offered an outline of the general outlook of these two schools we discuss what Frege took to be the purpose of his logicism. In the light of this discussion we aim to highlight why we think that the Scottish school is not only closer to Frege’s own project but also draw attention to some inherent short-comings of what can be achieved if one pursues the programme of the Stanford/Edmonton school.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Rossberg&quot;&gt;Marcus Rossberg&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=philipebert&quot;&gt;Philip Ebert&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Marcus Rossberg, &quot;Leonard, Goodman, and the Development of the Calculus of Individuals&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=968</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper investigates the relation of the Calculus of Individuals presented by 
Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman in their joint paper, and an earlier version 
of it, the so-called Calculus of Singular Terms, introduced by Leonard in his Ph.D. 
dissertation thesis <i>Singular Terms</i>. The latter calculus is shown to be a proper 
subsystem of the former. Further, Leonard’s projected extension of his system is 
described, and the definition of an intensional part-relation in his system is proposed. 
The final section discusses to what extend Goodman might have contributed to the 
formulation of the Calculus of Individuals.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Rossberg&quot;&gt;Marcus Rossberg&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Ross Cameron, &quot;Comments on Merricks' 'Truth and Ontology'&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=967</link>
            <description></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Ross&quot;&gt;Ross Cameron&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Ross Cameron, Elizabeth Barnes, &quot;The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=966</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it.  In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature.  We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Ross&quot;&gt;Ross Cameron&lt;/a&gt;, Elizabeth Barnes</author>
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            <title>Andrew Boucher, &quot;General Arithmetic&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=965</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The deductive power of weak arithmetics, especially second-order logic plus induction plus the functionality of successoring, is investigated.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=aboucher&quot;&gt;Andrew Boucher&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Andrew Boucher, &quot;General Arithmetic&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=964</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The deductive power of weak arithmetics, especially second-order logic plus induction plus the functionality of successoring, is investigated.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=aboucher&quot;&gt;Andrew Boucher&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Andrew Boucher, &quot;Proving Bertrand's Posutlate&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=963</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Bertand's Postulate is proved in Peano Arithmetic minus the Successor Axiom.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=aboucher&quot;&gt;Andrew Boucher&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Paul Raymont, &quot;From HOTs to Self-Representing States&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=962</link>
            <description><![CDATA[After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for such accounts from the possibility of an ‘empty HOT’, a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent.  I argue that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal for HOT-theory.  I argue also that the lesson of the failure of HOT-theory is that we should adopt the view that has recently been proposed by Uriah Kriegel and others, according to which conscious states are self-representing states.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=praymont1&quot;&gt;Paul Raymont&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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            <title>Paul Raymont, &quot;Some Experienced Qualities Belong to the Experience&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=961</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious.  The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them.  Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself.  Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent.  This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=praymont1&quot;&gt;Paul Raymont&lt;/a&gt;</author>
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